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Patterson: Patterson: Proxy Puzzle & the Durable Power

Notes
The Proxy Puzzle & The Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care Act
I. INTRODUCTION
The Missouri Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act' (the
Health Care Act) is the latest development in Missouri concerning proxy
health care decision making. The Health Care Act, the Living Will Statute,2
and the Missouri Supreme Court's Cruzan' decision are the pieces which
make up the puzzle known as Missouri proxy health care decision-making
law. When the pieces are put together, however, it appears that some pieces
are missing. This Note addresses the relationship of the Health Care Act to
the other two pieces of Missouri law and searches for the pieces which seem
to have been left out of the puzzle.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Health Care Act is the product of a combination of common law,
constitutional law, and ideologies of various interest groups. The question of
who should make medical decisions for incompetents has been brought to the
fore by advances in medical technology over the past fifteen to twenty years.
One commentator has stated that "[m]edical technology has effectively created
a twilight zone of suspended animation where death commences while life, in
some form, continues."4 The issue of who decides how long to preserve this
form of life has become the subject of much litigation.
A. History of Surrogate Medical Decision Making
The cases which preceded the Missouri Supreme Court's decision on the
issue of the right to refuse medical treatment applied several different tests.

1. Mo. REv.

STAT.

§§ 404.800-.865 (Supp. 1991).

§§ 459.010-.055 (1986).
3. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
4. Choices: Dealing With Dying, ESTATE PLANNING UPDATE, Vol. 1, Issue 1
(Special Courses, School of Law & University Extension, University of MissouriColumbia), at 1 (citing Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (1987)).
2. Mo. REv.

STAT.
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These tests included a substituted judgment standard, 5 a net benefits and
burdens test,6 and a requirement of clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's intent.7 One court held "that the invasiveness of the treatment
sought to be terminated is an important factor to be considered" but not a
controlling factor.8 Later courts abandoned their focus on the type of
treatment and instead focused on the prognosis of the patient, his or her
quality of life in view of the burdens of treatment, and the benefit to the
patient of continued life. 9 The courts have also disagreed as to whether the
right to refuse treatment is derived from the Constitution or the common
law.' 0

5. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
431 (Mass. 1977) (to apply the substituted judgment standard the court determines
what decision "would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were
competent, but taking into account the present and future incompetency of the
individual as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making
process of the competent person."); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 992 (1976) ("The only practical way to prevent destruction of the
right [to refuse medical treatment] is to permit the guardian and family [of the patient]
to render their best judgment ... as to whether she would exercise it in these
circumstances.").
6. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). When there is no trustworthy
evidence of intent or no evidence of intent at all, the New Jersey Supreme Court
applies a net benefits and net burdens test. Id. at 1232. If the net burdens of the
patient's life clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits the patient derives from life
such that administering life-sustaining treatment is inhumane, then the treatment may
be terminated. Id.
7. See In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied,454 U.S. 858 (1981). The
New York Court of Appeals rejected the concept of substituted judgment because
when a person has never been competent "it is unrealistic to attempt to determine
whether he would want to continue potentially life prolonging treatment if he were
competent." Id. at 72. The court adopted a standard of clear and convincing evidence
of the patient's intent. Id.
8. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 637 (Mass. 1986).
9. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 421 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom.,
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); Barbara
Miltenberger, Comment, The Dilemma of the Person in a Persistent Vegetative State:
A Plea to the Legislaturefor Help, 54 Mo. L. REV. 645, 649 (1989).
10. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64
(N.J.) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 992 (1976), where the court held that "[the patient] had
a right of privacy grounded in the Federal Constitution to terminate treatment."); see
also Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424
(Mass. 1977) (court applied both the constitutional right to privacy and the common
law right to refuse medical treatment.). But cf. Storar,420 N.E.2d at 70 (the court did
not fully accept that the constitutional right to privacy included a right to refuse
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While courts have disagreed on the test to determine whether a third
person could exercise the incompetent's right to refuse treatment and the basis
of that right, they have identified four countervailing state interests which may
limit that right." Those interests are: (1) preserving life; (2) preventing
suicide; (3) safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession; and (4)
protecting innocent third parties. 12 According to one commentator, "the
state's interest in preserving life has been 13
the central focus when balancing the
state's interest against a person's rights."'
In balancing these state interests against the individual's common law
right to refuse treatment and constitutional right to privacy, "[n]early
unanimously... courts have found a way to allow persons wishing to die, or
those who seek the death of a ward, to meet the end sought."' 4 The Missouri
Supreme Court, however, is not one of those courts.
B. Missouri's Treatment of SurrogateDecision Making
The Missouri Supreme Court decision in Cruzan v. Harmon15 was one
of first impression, and the court thoroughly examined the history of the
ability of a third person to exercise an incompetent's right to refuse treatment.' 6 Nancy Cruzan was a young woman in a persistent vegetative state
as the result of an automobile accident.' 7 She was dependent upon artificial
nutrition and hydration, but she was not diagnosed as terminally ill.'
The Missouri Supreme Court recognized no "unfettered right of privacy"
under the Missouri Constitution which would "support the right of a person
to refuse medical treatment in every circumstance."1 9 The court then turned
to the federal constitution. The court found that the United States Supreme
Court had made no express application of the right to privacy to decisions to
terminate nutrition and hydration.20 The Missouri Supreme Court went on

treatment, so it based its decisionon the common law right to refuse treatment.).
11. See Miltenberger, supra note 9, at 650.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,412 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom., Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
15. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), affid sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't
of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
16. Id. at 412-16.
17. Id. at 411.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 417.
20. Id. at 418.
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to state that because of the language in Roe v. Wade 1 and Bowers v.
Hardwick,22 which restricted the scope of the right to privacy, it had "grave
doubts as to the applicability of privacy rights to decisions to terminate the
provision of food and water to an incompetent patient."23
The Missouri Supreme Court did, however, recognize a competent
person's common-law right to refuse medical treatment.u The court then
determined that it was "definitionally impossible" for an incompetent person
to give informed consent or to withhold consent?25
The court then addressed the four countervailing state interests,2 but
stated that only the interest in preservation of life was at issue.27 The court
divided this interest into two separate concerns: the prolongation of the life
of the individual patient and the sanctity of life itself.2 The court then
stated that the interest in prolonging life decreases when the affliction "would
soon cause death regardless of any medical treatment." 29 Turning to the
state's interest in the sanctity of life, the court stated that "[t]he state's concern
with the sanctity of life rests on the principle that life is precious and worthy
of preservation without regard to its quality."3 The court arrived at this
3 ' establishes a
conclusion by stating that the Missouri Living Will Statute
32
quality.
its
of
regardless
legislative policy to preserve life
The court next balanced the individual constitutional privacy right and
common law right to refuse treatment against the state's interest in life.33 In
applying the balancing test, the court reiterated that the individual's rights are
not absolute and the state's interest in preserving life exists without regard to

21.
22.
23.
24.

410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 418.
Id. at 416-17.

25. Id. at 417.
26. Id. at 419.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456
(Mass. 1979)).
30. Id.
31. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (1986).
32. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419-20. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.055(5) (1986)
("Sections 459.010 to 459.055 do not condone, authorize or approve mercy killing or
euthanasia nor permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to shorten or end
life.").
33. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 421-24. The court seemed to assume that the

constitutional right to privacy applied for the purpose of balancing interests, even
though they expressed doubt that the right applied to decisions regarding the
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration earlier in the opinion. Id. at 417-18.
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life's quality.' The court determined that the state's interest in life outweighed Cruzan's right to refuse treatmentY5 Considering the interest in
prolonging life, the court found that Cruzan was not terminally ill, and refused
to consider her quality of life in a persistent vegetative state.3 When the
court addressed the state's concern with the sanctity of life, they 'stated the
"issue is not whether the continued feeding and hydration of Nancy is medical
treatment; it is whether feeding and providing liquid to Nancy is a burden to
her. 3 7 The court determined that the continuation of artificial nutrition and
hydration is not a burden or "heroically invasive."38 The court then determined that the evidence of Nancy's statements when competent was not "clear
'
proof of a patient's intent. 39
Therefore, the evidence did not meet the
requirements of informed consent. 40
Finally, the court rejected the doctrine of substituted judgment. 41 The
court reasoned that a third person could not exercise the incompetent's right
to refuse treatment "in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's
Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence
absent here." 42 The court then explained that "[a] guardian's power to
exercise third party choice arises from the state's authority, not the constitutional rights of the ward. ' 43 This led the court to find that guardians must
act consistently with the state's interest in the preservation of life and that
state guardianship law 44 imposed a duty to continue- the life-sustaining
treatment.45
The Missouri Supreme Court looked to the legislature to establish the
state's policy with regard to the preservation of life.46 The court stated that

34. Id. at 421-22.
35. Id. at 424.

36. Id. at 422.
37. Id. at 423.
38. Id. The court did concede that the surgical insertion of a gastrostomy tube
is invasive but seemed to rule that the invasiveness of the tube ends once it is inserted
and functioning. Id. at 422-23.
39. Id. at 424 (citing In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (N.J. 1987)).
40. Id.

41. Id. at 425.
42. Id. The court found that Nancy Cruzan's statements prior to her incompetency were "informally expressed reactions to other people's medical condition and
treatment" and did not meet the clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence
standard. Id. at 424.
43. Id. at 425.
44. Mo. REv.STAT. § 475.120.3 (1986).
45. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424-26.
46. Id. at 426.
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"[i]f there is to be a change in that policy, it must come from the people
through their elected representatives."'4 7 Like other courts faced with this
issue, the court invited the state legislature to take up the issue.48 Because
Cruzan broke with prior case law in this area, the decision was ripe for review
by the United States Supreme Court.
C. The United States Supreme Court's View of
Missouri'sDecision
The sole issue on appeal to the Court was whether the Constitution
prohibited Missouri from requiring a clear and convincing, inherently reliable
evidence standard in cases that addressed the right to refuse treatment. 49 In
a five to four decision, the Court found that under the Fourteenth Amendment, 50 "[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from ...

prior decisions."'

The Court then based its decision upon

the assumption that the Constitution "would grant a competent person a...
'
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. 52
The Court, however,
affirmed the state's standard of clear and convincing evidence of intent to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.53 The Court found that Missouri can
assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.54 To further

47. Id.
48. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court stated:
Broad policy questions bearing on life and death issues are more properly
addressed by representative assemblies. These have vast fact and opinion
gathering and synthesizing powers unavailable to the courts; the exercise of
these powers is particularly appropriate where issues invoke the concerns
of medicine, ethics, morality, philosophy, theology and law. Assuming
change is appropriate, the issue demands a comprehensive resolution which
courts cannot provide.
Id. See also Miltenberger, supra note 9, at 653-54 (listing similar cases decided in
other states calling for legislative action).
49. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State ...shall.., deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.').
51. Cruzan, 110 S.Ct. at 2851 (emphasis added). See id. at 2859-60 (Justice
Scalia is the only justice who denies the existence of a constitutional right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment).
52. Id. at 2852.

53. Id. at 2854.
54. Id.
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this interest, the state can require heightened evidentiary requirements to
safeguard the personal element of choice between life and death. 5
Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphasized the narrowness of the
decision: "Today we decide only that one State's practice does not violate the
Constitution; the more challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for
safeguarding incompetents' liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of
the States. 5 6 This challenge led the Missouri General Assembly into the
laboratory.
D. Legislative History of the Durable Power of Attorney
for Health CareAct
The publicity surrounding the Cruzan decisions heightened the concern
of Missouri citizens with respect to these issues. Many citizens were
concerned with how they could meet the clear and convincing evidence
standard which the Missouri Supreme Court enunciated in Cruzan. 7

The Missouri Living Will Statute "was inadequate for this purpose
because it contained strict limitations" on the use of the living will.58 The
Living Will Statute's two most important restrictions are: (1) the requirement
that the patient be in a "terminal condition," and (2) the exclusion of artificial
nutrition and hydration from the definition of "death-prolonging procedures"
which may be withheld or withdrawn from a patient in a terminal condition.5 9 A terminal condition is defined by the Living Will Statute as "an
incurable or irreversible condition which ...

is such that death will occur

6
within a short time regardless of the applications of medical treatment.", 0
This definition prohibits a person in a persistent vegetative state, like Nancy
Cruzan, from having her living will honored. A person who executed a living
will would be unable to invoke it, because the Living Will Statute excludes
the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from the definition of deathprolonging procedures. Because of the inadequacies in the Living Will

55. Id. at 2853. The Court based its decision upon Missouri's ability to make a
societal judgment and place the risk of an erroneous decision upon those seeking to
terminate an incompetent individual's life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 2854. The
Court also stated that Missouri "may choose to defer to only those wishes [previously
expressed by the patient], rather than confide the decision to close family members."
Id. at 2856.
56. Id. at 2859.
57. Catherine J. Barrie, Legislative History ofMissouri Senate Bill 148, Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 453, 454 (1992).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 455. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010, .025 (1986).
60. Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.010.
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Statute, the Missouri legislature introduced several different versions of Health
Care Surrogate and Durable Power of Attorney Acts. 6'
These acts were debated fiercely and the current Health Care Act is the
result of "considerable negotiation and compromise between various interest
groups."'62 Those who believed that state intervention in family health care
decisions invaded privacy were at odds with those in the pro-life movement
who believed the state had an unqualified interest in the preservation of
life." Initially the pro-life movement maintained the greatest influence.6
The publicity of the Cruzan decision shifted the balance of influence in favor
of those groups supporting advance directive legislation.0 Many portions of
the bill, however, resulted from compromise. While controversies raged over
many parts of the Act, the main controversies concerned the issue of
withholding or withdrawing nutrition and hydration" and issues of euthanasia, mercy killing, and assisted suicide. 67
According to one commentator, "[t]he issue of artificially supplied
nutrition and hydration was one of the most controversial aspects" of the
Health Care Act.68 A conflict was-sure to follow, because
pro-life activists wanted an extremely strict definition of the circumstances
under which artificially supplied nutrition and hydration could be withdrawn. They viewed this procedure not as medical treatment but rather as
a "basic necessity of life." In contrast, those groups lobbying in support of
the bill generally wanted broad authority for a designated agent to withdraw
artificially supplied
nutrition and hydration in appropriate medical
69
circumstances.
This conflict led to many compromises.

61. Barrie, supra note 57, at 455-56.
62. Id. at 455.
63. Id.
64. Id. The pro-life movement's early influence and success led to the "repeated
rejection of the Health Care Surrogate Act as drafted by the Bar Committee." Id.
65. Id. at 456.
66. Id. at 464-69.
67. Id. at 469-71. Some of the smaller controversies were over definitions used
in the Act. Id. at 458-59. Some groups argued that the definitions in the new law
should be based upon the state's guardianship law. Id. at 458. The references to
guardianship law were avoided by the legislature because the Missouri Supreme Court
expressly found that guardians could not consent to withdrawal or termination of
treatment. Id. at 458-59.
68. Id. at 464.
69. Id. (footnote omitted).
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First, it led to the requirement that a patient must specifically grant
authority to withhold or withdraw nutrition or hydration in the power of
attorney document.7" Second, because of a concern that spoon feeding might
be construed as "medical treatment," the Act prohibited the withdrawal of
nutrition and hydration which could be ingested naturally. 71 There were
several attempts to amend the Act and restrict the withdrawal or withholding
of artificial nutrition and hydration to specific medical situations.7' Many
groups fiercely opposed these amendments. 73 It appeared, however, that the
Missouri governor would veto the bill if it did not contain what he termed as
additional "safeguards." 74 The legislature did not want to delay implementation by using a referendum to bypass the governor. 75 This led to a compromise in the final days of the legislative session, requiring particular procedures
to be followed in-all cases before artificial nutrition and hydration could be
withheld or withdrawn.76
The grant of authority to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and
hydration is restricted in the following ways:
(1) the principal must
specifically grant this authority; (2) the attorney in fact cannot order the
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration which are ingested through natural
means; (3) the attorney in fact must consider appropriate measures in accord
with current standards of medical practice; (4) before the attorney in fact or
physician can authorize the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, the
physician must explain to the patient the intention to withdraw nutrition and
hydration and its consequences. 77 This provides the patient an opportunity
to refuse the withdrawal. If the patient is somehow incapacitated, the
physician must certify that it is impossible for the principal to understand the
intention to withdraw nutrition and hydration and the consequences thereof. 78
The other major controversy in the Health Care Act concerned the issues
of euthanasia, mercy killing, and assisted self-murder. 79 Opponents of the
bill felt enactment would lead to state-sanctioned euthanasia, mercy killing,
and assisted self-murder.'
Efforts to include language prohibiting these

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
1991).
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. See Mo. REy. STAT. § 404.820.1 (Supp. 1991).
Barrie, supra note 57, at 464-65. See Mo. REV.STAT. § 404.820.2.
Barrie, supra note 57, at 465.
Id. at 465-66.
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id. The required procedures are found in Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.820.4 (Supp.
Barrie, supra note 57, at 464-69.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 469-71.
Id. at 469.
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practices were defeated "because of the absence of any objective definition"
of those terms.8' A compromise was achieved, however, and language was
added which required "the attorney in fact making any health care decision to
'seek and consider information concerning the patient's medical diagnosis, the
patient's prognosis and the benefits and burdens of the treatment to the patient
... to the extent possible within prevailing medical standards.' 8, 2 This
provision was added to avoid the use of "emotionally loaded terms" and to
prevent
arbitrary decision making and abuse of power by an attorney in
3
fact.
The controversies surrounding the act were resolved in the final weeks
of the 86th General Assembly. Senate Bill 148, the Health Care Act, was
signed by the governor on May 17, 1991 and went into effect August 28,
1991.
III. ANALYSIS AND COMMENT
The law concerning the ability of a third person to exercise an incompetent individual's right to refuse medical treatment can be evaluated on three
tiers. The first tier is where a competent adult makes a directive regarding
appropriate medical treatment before incompetency occurs.Y The second tier
is where a competent adult fails to make an advance directive of his or her
wishes regarding medical treatment and later becomes incompetent. The final
tier represents minors and adults who have never become competent under the
law.86 Missouri's law addresses the first two tiers, and they will be the focus
of this analysis.
A. Tier I - The Competent DesignatingAdult
The purpose of the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act is to
allow "a person to designate another to make health care decisions for
him-including the withdrawal or withholding of nutrition and hydration-if
the person becomes incapacitated." ' A durable power of attorney for health
care may, however, reflect two separate intents of the patient. First, the

81. Id. at 469-70.
82. Id. at 470 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.822 (Supp. 1991)).
83. Id.

84. Id. at 453.
85. Such an advance directive would be the execution of a living will or durable
power of attorney for health care.
86. This group is by definition unable to execute a valid advance directive.
87. Jennifer B. Furla, New Law Ensures Right to Name Proxy for Health Care

Decisions, Mo. LAW WKLY., May 27, 1991, at 1, 20.
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durable power of attorney for health care reflects the patient's intent to
designate a surrogate decision maker. Secondly, it may be evidence of the
patient's intent regarding withholding and withdrawing medical treatment.
If a durable power of attorney for health care is not executed properly
and is invalid as a means for designating a surrogate decision maker, it may
still meet the Cruzan clear and convincing evidence standard to allow the
patient's wishes to be carried out.8 Similarly, if the person is incapacitated
in another state which does not recognize the Missouri Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care, the document could be offered as evidence of the
person's intent with regard to medical decisions.8 9 Whether the durable
power of attorney provides evidence of intent regarding withholding and
withdrawing medical treatment is a question of drafting.
A simple durable power of attorney for health care merely appoints an
attorney in fact without providing any specific guidance for decision making
other than the restrictions of the Health Care Act. The document may go
further, however, and authorize the attorney in fact to order the withholding
or withdrawal of certain specific medical treatments, such as artificial nutrition
and hydration. 9° A sophisticated durable power of attorney for health care
would direct the attorney in fact to make specific decisions regarding the
withdrawal of specific medical treatments, such as artificial hydration and
nutrition, in certain situations. While it is unclear how specific the directions
must be to satisfy the Cruzan standard, a sophisticated document should
provide adequate evidence of intent.
Despite the benefits of executing a sophisticated durable power of
attorney for health care, some commentators suggest that a competent
designating adult still needs to execute a living will to insure that her wishes
are carried out.91 Furthermore, a person who is uncomfortable choosing a
particular surrogate decision maker and seeks more control of his future may
wish to execute a living will and not a durable power of attorney for health

88. See Justice O'Conner's concurrence in Cruzan. She stated that, with regard
to whether a state must respect the decisions of appointed surrogates, "a duty may well
be constitutionally required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing inedical
treatment." Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2857 (1990).
She further stated that "procedures for surrogate decision making, which appear to be
rapidly gaining in acceptance, may be a valuable additional safeguard of the patient's
interest in directing his medical care." Id. at 2858.
89. Id.
90. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.820.1 (Supp. 1991) (This section requires a patient

to specifically grant the authority to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition or
hydration in the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care document.).
91. See New Health CareDurablePowerLaw, EST. PLAN. UPDATE, vol. 1, issue
2 (Special Courses, School of Law and University Extension, University of MissouriColumbia), at 2.
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care.' Persons who execute a living will are not required to designate a
particular individual to make decisions for them.93 Their living will simply
tells physicians that they want to die naturally and want medical treatment
withheld if they are in a terminal condition. 94 Other commentators suggest
that a durable power of attorney for health care's directions to the attorney in
fact can be made specific enough to have the same effect and eliminate the
need for a living will. 95
In addition to seeming redundant, portions of the Living Will Statute
conflict with the Health Care Act. Both acts have a conscience clause.
Under the Living Will Statute, attending physicians or health care facilities
which are unwilling to honor the living will's directions must take all
reasonable steps to transfer the patient to a physician or facility which will
honor the documentY The Health Care Act requires a physician or health
care provider to honor a durable power of attorney if the hospital receives a
copy of the document before beginning treatment. 98 The Act merely forbids
the physician or health care facility to impede efforts by the attorney in fact
to transfer the patient if they refuse to honor the document. 9 While these
provisions appear to reach the same result, there is some uncertainty as to
which act controls when a patient has executed both documents. 1°°

92. This is especially true for those patients who would only trust their doctors
to be their attorney in fact. In that case the living will may be more appropriate
because the Health Care Act prohibits personal physicians and other immediate health
care providers from serving as the attorney in fact. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.815 (Supp.
1991). There is a limited exception to that rule if the physician is closely related to
the patient or if the patient and the physician are both members of certain religious
groups. Id.
93. New Health CareDurablePowerLaw, supra note 91, at 2.
94. Id.
95. Interview with Chris Kelly, Member, Missouri General Assembly, in
Columbia, Mo. (Sept. 9, 1991). The argument is that a durable power of attorney for
health care can be drafted to include specific instructions such that the attorney in fact
has no discretion in making certain decisions with regard to the withdrawal of certain
types of medical treatment. The only role the attorney in fact serves under such a
document would be to communicate the patient's advance directions. Because of the
specificity of the directions in the durable power of attorney for health care, it serves
the same purpose as a living will: it is as an advance directive directly to the
physician or care giver. Id.
96. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 404.830 (1991 Supp.), 459.030 (1986).
97. Mo. REV. STAT.'§ 459.030.

98. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.830.
99. Id.
100. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (1986) with Mo. REV. STAT. §§
404.800-.865 (1991). Neither the Living Will Act or the Durable Power of Attorney
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Similarly, in the event that a person has executed both a living will and
a durable power of attorney for health care, both statutes are silent as to which
document controls medical treatment decisions. 10'
The Missouri Bar
suggests that in the event both documents are executed, the durable power of
attorney for health care should control.'02 The Missouri Bar Durable Power
of Attorney Sample Form includes language to the effect that the patient
wishes the attorney in fact to act in accordance with the directions in the
living will.'0 3 The bar form, however, also contains an exception which
authorizes the attorney in fact to make decisions contrary to the directions in
the living will if the decision is in the patient's best interest. 1°" Missouri
law, however, does not require the patient executing both documents to make
such a distinction.'05 This gap in the law could create confusion as to
whether a living will's specific direction controls or whether the judgment of
the attorney in fact controls under the durable power of attorney for health
care.

The most striking conflict is that the Living Will Statute does not allow
the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration.106 If one executes a living will
which exceeds this restriction by ordering the withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration, it would probably satisfy the clear and convincing evidence
standard of Cruzan.1°7 The Living Will Statute's exclusion of artificial
nutrition and hydration from the definition of death-prolonging procedures
may be an unconstitutional restriction upon the Fourteenth Amendment

for Health Care Act contain a provision which indicates which document controls in
the event of conflicting statutory commands.
101. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055; 404.800-.865. Both the Living Will
Act and the Health Care Act are also silent as to which controls when the specific
directions of the living will and the judgment of the attorney in fact are in conflict.
102. See DURABLE POWER OF ATrORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE AND HEALTH CARE
DIRECTIvE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, INSTRUCTIONS AND SAMPLE FORM 13 (Mo. Bar

July 19, 1991). Part three of the Missouri Bar sample form contains language
establishing the "Relationship between Directive and Durable Power of Attorney." Id.
103. Id.

104. Id.
105. See Mo. REv STAT. §§ 459.010-.055, 404.800-.865.
106. Compare Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.010(3) with Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.820

(1991). The Living Will Statute allows the terminally ill incompetent patient to direct
the withdrawal of "death-prolonging procedures" in advance of his or her incompetency. Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.015. Procedures for providing nutrition or hydration,

however, are expressly excluded from the statutory definition of "death-prolonging
procedures." Id. § 459.010. See also supra notes 59 - 61 and accompanying test.
107. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to
"individual's deeply personal decision tb reject medical treatment, including the
artificial delivery of food and water.").
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"liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment" which the United
States Supreme Court inferred from its prior decisions in Cruzan.108
Because of the inconsistencies between the Health Care Act and the
Living Will Statute and the uncertainty created for persons wishing to make
an advance directive, the legislature -should take steps to amend the Living
Will Statute so that it is consistent with the Health Care Act. The effect of
the Health Care Act is to grant informed competent adults the ability to avoid
Nancy Cruzan's dilemma and exercise their right to refuse treatment despite
incapacity. The Health Care Act does not appear, however, to aid those
persons who were not informed of their options or simply lacked the foresight
to plan for the event of incapacity.
B. Tier II- The Nondesignating Competent Adult
The second tier of evaluation concerns the situation in which a competent
adult never makes an advance directive, and there is no competent evidence
of intent before he or she becomes incompetent. The question of who will
make medical decisions for this class of persons remains unanswered.
This question was the focus of the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in
Cruzan v. Harmon. Although the court found that a guardian has an
affirmative duty to provide medical treatment and the power to consent to
such treatment, the court found that there was no statutory basis for a guardian
to order the termination of medical treatment.1 0 The court then announced
that there must be clear and convincing evidence of the incompetent's intent
to have medical treatment withheld or withdrawn.110 It seems odd that the
guardian has a duty to consent to the surgical insertion of a gastronomy tube,
which the court conceded was a heroically invasive procedure, but cannot act
on behalf of the patient to have it removed."' In sum, the guardian has the
power and duty to consent to invasive medical treatment, but once consent is
given, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent
would order the medical treatment to be withheld or withdrawn. The benefits
and burdens to the patient are not taken into account. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed Missouri's ability to develop its own standard without
endorsing it as the proper standard.1 The Supreme Court recognized that
"[s]tate courts have available to them for decision a number of sources-state

108. Id., at 2851. See also Barrie, supra note 57, at 455; supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
109. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,424 (Mo. 1988), affd sub nom. Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
110. Id. See also supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 38, 45 and accompanying text.
112. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852-54.
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constitutions, statutes, and common law-which are not available to us." '
Based upon this observation, the Court left the development of procedures to
protect the incompetent's liberty interests to the laboratory of the states." 4
The Missouri Supreme Court recognized the importance of state policy
enunciated by the state legislature in its decision. 15 The Missouri Supreme
Court stated that "broad policy decisions bearing on life or death issues are
more appropriately addressed by representative assemblies."" 6 The Missouri
General Assembly has taken up these issues, and the adoption of the Health
Care Act might result in a different outcome of Cruzan v. Harmon today. The
decision in Cruzan v. Harmon was based heavily upon the Missouri Supreme
Court's interpretation of legislative policy as enunciated in the Living Will
Statute.'17 The court found that the restrictive language of the Living Will
Statute established an interest in the preservation of life without regard to its
quality." 8 The Health Care Act may signal a shift in that policy.
The Missouri Living Will Statute is very narrow in application because
it requires that the patient be in a terminal condition and excludes the
provision of nutrition and hydration from the definition of death-prolonging
procedures which may be withheld or withdrawn." 9 These restrictions were
the basis of the court's interpretation of the state's unqualified interest in the
preservation of life. 20 The Health Care Act does not include either of these
restrictions.
The Health Care Act does provide certain procedural steps an attorney in
fact must follow if the request is to withdraw or withhold artificial nutrition
or hydration. The Act, however, is consistent with legal decisions throughout
the country in characterizing the procedure as medical treatment.' 2 ' This
characterization should abolish any reason for basing state policy upon

113. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
114. Id. at 2854. See also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
115. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426; see also supra notes 46-48 and accompanying
text.
116. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426.
117. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419-20.
118. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 420.
119. See supra note 59; see also Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419-20 (comparing
Missouri's Living Will Statute and the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act upon
which the Missouri statute is modeled and explaining why Missouri modifications of
the model enunciate an interest in the preservation of life without regard to quality).
120. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419-20.
121. See, e.g., Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 (O'Conner, J., concurring) ("Artificial
feeding cannot readily be distinguished from other forms of medical treatment" and
"the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything,
an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the
artificial delivery of food and water.").
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distinctions between medical treatment and procedures to provide artificial
nutrition or hydration.
The Health Care Act requires the attorney in fact to consider "the
patient's medical diagnosis, the patient's prognosis and the benefits and
burdens of the treatment to the patient."'" This is similar to the net burden
and net benefit test enunciated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In Re
Conroy.1 3 Although the attorney in fact does not consider only the net
burdens placed upon life by the preexisting condition and the treatment, the
attorney in fact makes decisions about the treatment's effect upon the
principal's quality of life. This test also seems similar to the one enunciated
in Cruzan v. Harmon.24 The Missouri Supreme Court's formula in Cruzan,
however, "denies equal recognition to quality of life considerations arising out
of the patient's disease."' 25
. In addition to considering the benefits and burdens of the treatment, the
Health Care Act requires the attorney in fact to consider the medical diagnosis
and prognosis of the patient. Diagnosis is defined as "the nature of a case of
disease."'" Prognosis is defined as "a forecast of the probable course and
outcome of an attack of disease and the prospects of recovery as indicated by
the nature of the disease and the symptoms of the case.', 127 By definition,
these terms include the consideration of the burdens of a disease upon a
patient as manifested through the disease's nature and symptoms. This
additional concern for the patient's medical diagnosis and prognosis implies
that quality of life considerations arising out of the patient's disease are part
of the formula for the attorney in fact. This section could be viewed as a
statement of the people of Missouri through the legislature: when weighing
the state's interest in the preservation of life, some inquiry should be given to
the patient's quality of life as affected by the disease and the treatment.
While Cruzan states that a guardian may consent to treatment but may
not withhold or withdraw treatment,12 the Health Care Act recognizes the
ability of a third person to consent to the withholding or withdrawal of
medical treatment. 29 The Missouri court, however, rejected the ability of
a third person to exercise the rights of the incompetent in absence of the strict

122. Mo.

REV. STAT.

§ 404.822 (Supp. 1991).

123. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
124. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424.

125. Philip G. Peters, The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From
Quinlan to Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 893, 948 (1989).
126. BENJAMIN F. MILLER & CLAIRE B. KEANE,
NARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH

ENCYCLOPEDIA AND

DicrIo-

349 (4th ed. 1987).

127. Id. at 1015.
128. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424.
129. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.822 (Supp. 1991); Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424.
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formalities of the Living Will Statute assigning that right.130 The Health
Care Act, however, is not as rigid as the Living Will Statute. The Health
Care Act allows the attorney in fact to make medical decisions for the
incompetent as long as his decision is "within prevailing medical standards."' 3' The courts could place a similar restriction upon the family or
guardian with equal force.
By allowing an attending physician or another health care provider who
is closely related to the patient to act as attorney in fact, the Missouri
Legislature establishes a policy of deference towards family decision
The court in Cruzan did not have the benefit of such an
makers.
expression of policy when it rejected the substituted judgment of family
members and the guardian. Furthermore, the concerns which the Missouri
court expressed about the motives of family members are the same when the
decision maker is an attorney in fact. 133 These concerns can be addressed
by requiring family members or the guardian to perform a diagnosis,
prognosis, and analysis of the benefits and burdens of treatment, similar to the
requirements for an attorney in fact under the Health Care Act.1 31 The profamily policy, the broad decision making powers of the attorney in fact, and
the diagnosis, prognosis, and benefits and burdens of treatment analysis might
lead the court to change its decision when no advance directive exists, and
defer to family or guardian decision making.
While the adoption of the Health Care Act appears to reverse the policy
established by the Living Will Act, the Living Will Act still remains in force
and unchanged. A court could interpret this as evidence that the state wishes
to cling to its old policy as enunciated in Cruzan v. Harmon. The Living Will
Statute should be amended to make the policy statements of the Missouri
Legislature clear and consistent. The negotiations and compromises in
Act may signal, however, that the
drafting the Durable Power of Attorney
35
legislature is unsure of its policy.
The Missouri Supreme Court noted that "[r]epresentative bodies generally
move much more deliberately than do courts; [courts] are a bit slow and
ponderous.' 36 The court further recognized that changes in policy with
regard to "issues of life and death" are best made by the "surefooted"

130. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 425.
131. Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.820 (Supp. 1991).
132. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.815(1) (Supp. 1991) (the Act allows an attending
physician or employee of the health care provider to serve as attorney in fact if related
to the patient within the second degree of consanguinity).
133. See Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424-27.
134. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.822 (Supp. 1991).

135. See supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
136. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 426.
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decisions of the legislature.3 7 The court, therefore, may wait for a more
clear statement of policy from the Missouri Legislature before it departs from
the reasoning of the Cruzan v. Harmon decision.
C. Tier III - The Never Competent Person
The third tier of analysis, applied to minors and adults who have never
become competent, has not been addressed by the legislature, but may be
addressed by the Missouri Supreme Court in In re Busalacchi."8 Christine
Busalacchi is in much the same position as Nancy Cruzan. Christine,
however, was only a minor when she entered into a persistent vegetative state
and received a gastronomy tube. 3 9 Christine's father and guardian is
seeking to move her to Minnesota for further testing. 140 The state alleges
that his only purpose is to move Christine to a state which will allow the
removal of her gastronomy tube. 141 The Missouri Court of Appeals viewed
the central issue as defining "the guardian's duty as it relates to his obligation
to provide for the health care of his ward." 14' The case has been transferred
to the Missouri Supreme Court, and oral arguments were heard in September
1992. Other issues the supreme court might address are the guardian's rights
as the natural parent of the incompetent and whether a person is considered
a minor based upon the age at which she became incapacitated or upon
chronological age.143 The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in this case
will shed light not only on this third tier of analysis but also upon the first
two tiers.
V. CONCLUSION

Missouri proxy health care decision-making law is a puzzle which is still
incomplete. The pieces do not seem to fit together, and it appears some of the
pieces are missing. In light of the adoption of the Health Care Act, it appears
that the legislature should amend the Living Will Statute in order to achieve
conformity in this area of law.
The Health Care Act seems to have confused the issues concerning the
competent nondesignating adult. The legislature may have created a new

137. Id. at 426-27.

138. The Missouri Supreme Court heard oral arguments on.September 1,1992.
139. In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5,

1991).
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
See id.
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problem to which Cruzan might apply. The legislature has yet to address the
situation of minors and adults who have never been competent. Perhaps the
Missouri Supreme Court's upcoming decision in In re Busalacchiwill provide
guidelines for this situation or inspire the legislature to act."'
J. DANIEL PATTERSON

144. See supra note 138.
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